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Abstract  
We analyze the effect of municipal employees’ political representation in 
municipal councils on local public spending. To quantify the effect, we use 
within-party, as-good-as random variation in close elections in the Finnish  
open-list proportional election system. One more councilor employed by the 
public sector increases spending by about one percent. The effect comes largely 
through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the 
municipal employees. The results are consistent with public employees having an 
information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence 
policy.   
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1   Introduction 
In 2013, public sector employees accounted on average for 21% of the total employment in 
the OECD countries (OECD 2015). They are therefore a large interest group that can 
influence politics in various ways. In addition to a direct voting channel (see e.g. Garand 
1988, Blais et al. 1990, Bhatti and Hansen 2012), recent research has emphasized the role 
of public sector unions and their effects on the cost of government, either directly through 
collective bargaining or indirectly through politics (see e.g. Sieg and Wang 2013, Anzia 
and Moe 2015). 
Quite often public sector employees are also politicians themselves.1 This dual role of 
public sector employees has raised the concern that when elected, they may be in a better 
position to extract rents from holding the office than otherwise similar politicians employed 
by the private sector. A concrete example would be a teacher sitting in a municipal council 
that decides whether the teacher’s school should be closed or not, or a public sector nurse 
taking part in deciding on budget cuts in the local public health care sector. In both cases, 
the public sector employees can possibly exert disproportionate influence in the council due 
to their information advantage over the other councilors on the true costs and benefits of 
providing public services in their sector of employment (see e.g. Niskanen 1971 and Romer 
and Rosenthal 1979).  
Consistent with such concerns, most countries have imposed ineligibility rules on the 
political mandates of public sector employees.2 Imposing such restrictions involves a trade-
off by limiting the political participation of a group with possibly ample opportunities for 
rent-seeking at the cost of discriminating against a large citizen group and excluding 
                                                 
1 For example, Braendle and Stutzer (2016) report that in their sample of 76 countries the average fraction of 
politicians in national parliaments with a public sector background is 31.3%. 
2 Prominent examples include the Hatch Act of 1939 in the US and the House of Commons Disqualification 
Act of 1975 in the UK. The Local Government Act of 1972 and the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 
include similar restrictions for local government employees in the UK. See Braendle and Stutzer (2016) for 
examples in other countries.  
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informed candidates.3 However, there is surprisingly little evidence that when elected, 
public sector employees would act differently from the other politicians. We start to fill this 
gap in the literature by documenting a positive and both statistically and economically 
significant causal effect of municipal employee representation in a municipal council on 
local public spending using data from Finland.4 
The Finnish economy provides a particularly interesting context for such an analysis 
for two reasons. First, almost 30% of employment in Finland is in the public sector and 
more than 20% of employment is in the local public sector.5 An important feature of 
Finnish local politics, and common in other countries as well, is that being a municipal 
councilor is not a full-time job.6 The task typically takes a few hours a week and the 
monetary compensation involved is not nearly enough to live on. Therefore, most of the 
Finnish local politicians have a normal day job. In our data, this means that about one 
quarter (26%) of the local politicians work for their home municipality. The distribution of 
power between private and public sector employees in the municipal councils may 
therefore have a large impact on the size and efficiency of the local public sector. 
Reflecting this tension and its topicality, the Finnish media has expressed concerns that 
when elected, municipal employees can make decisions on their own jobs in municipal 
councils.7  
                                                 
3 Braendle and Stutzer (2010, 2016) show using German and cross-country data, respectively, that stricter 
ineligibility rules decrease the share of public servants in parliaments. Rosenson (2006) finds a connection 
between various ethics laws and representation of occupations. Braendle (2016) offers a survey on the effects 
of institutions and eligibility rules on political selection. 
4 Prior analyses closest to ours are Braendle and Stutzer (2013, 2016). For example, Braendle and Stutzer 
(2016) find a positive association between government size and the share of public servants in parliament 
using cross-country data. While insightful, neither study focuses on estimating causal effects.  
5 Figures for Finland from Statistics Finland Labor Force Survey 2015 (see 
http://www.tilastokeskus.fi/til/tyti/2014/02/tyti_2014_02_2014-03-25_tau_009_en.html, accessed 6.12.2015).  
6 The same applies, e.g., to the UK (Local Government Association 2012). 
7 For example, the Finnish National Broadcasting company YLE ran at the time of the latest municipal 
council elections an article with the title “Municipal employees decide on their own jobs in municipal 
councils”. See  
http://yle.fi/uutiset/kuntien_tyontekijat_paattavat_valtuustoissa_omista_tyopaikoistaan/6334347. 
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Another reason why Finland provides a suitable context for estimating the effect of 
public sector employee representation on public spending is that the Finnish open list local 
elections provide us with plausibly exogenous variation in municipal employee 
representation. To make use of this variation, we resort to candidate-level close contests 
within party lists to construct a municipality-level instrument variable for municipal 
employee representation. This procedure allows us to compare municipalities that, by 
chance, have marginally more municipal employees in their council to municipalities that, 
by chance, have marginally fewer. Our instrument captures the extent to which the seat 
share of municipal employees exceeds or falls short of their expected share due to 
randomness in the outcomes of the close elections. The identifying assumption is that when 
measured at the candidate level and sufficiently close to within party election thresholds, 
the seat allocation between municipal employees and other candidates can be considered to 
be as-good-as random. This assumption can be tested indirectly by covariate balance tests. 
We define candidate-level closeness within the party lists to make sure that differences in 
party representation (party effects) are not driving the results.  
Our main result is that electing one additional municipal employee to a council as 
opposed to a candidate from the same party, but from another occupation, increases local 
public spending. Our estimates suggest that in a municipality with a median-sized council 
(27 seats), the increase in local public spending is about 1 percent on average over the four-
year council term.8 The effect is surprisingly large for two reasons: First, we are probably 
looking at a relatively unimportant margin, i.e., the last elected candidates within a party to 
a council that typically consists of tens of councilors. Second, there are explicit restrictions 
on the types of political positions that Finnish municipal employees can take. Our result is 
                                                 
8 The estimated municipal employee effect is robust to simultaneously instrumenting for female council share. 
This finding is crucial for interpretation of the observed effects, because municipal employment status is 
correlated with gender. However, unlike e.g. Clots-Figueras (2011, 2012), we find no robust effect on public 
spending from increased female political participation. 
3
 
 
nevertheless in line with the previous findings which show that smaller parties and even 
individual councilors have an effect on policy in proportional representation systems (e.g. 
Folke 2014 and Freier and Odendahl 2015).9  
We also provide evidence on the mechanisms that are at work. First, we find that the 
effect varies by the type of municipal employee and the type of spending: electing one more 
employee who works for the health care sector leads to an increase in health expenditures, 
but not in the other (non-health) municipal expenditures. Similarly, when a non-health care 
employee gets elected, her getting to hold the office leads to an increase in expenditures 
unrelated to health care.10 Moreover, we can show that the positive effect on local public 
spending arises in particular in close elections that involve the largest party in the 
municipality. This evidence is consistent with municipal employee councilors influencing 
intra-party decision making. Such decision making has an effect on municipal policy only if 
the party is sufficiently large.  
Taken together, these findings are consistent with Niskanen’s (1971) classic 
bureaucracy model which predicts that bureaucrats can convince politicians to increase 
public spending due to their information advantage over the politicians on the costs of 
providing public services. Analogously, our municipal employee politicians have an 
information advantage over the other politicians in their party about the provision of public 
services in their own employment sector, but not in the other sectors.  
The sector specificity of the effects largely rule out that municipal employees increase 
spending because they always prefer a larger public sector (see e.g., Knutsen 2005, Jensen 
et al. 2009, Rattsø and Sørensen 2016). Our findings also imply that the identities of the 
                                                 
9 For studies on party effects in the U.S. context, see e.g. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), Gerber and Hopkins 
(2011) or de Benedictis-Kessner and Washaw (2016). The effects of political representation of other non-
partisan interests groups, such as women and minority and occupation groups, on policy outcomes has been 
studied by e.g. Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Gehlbach et al. (2010), Ferreira and Gyourko 
(2014) and Matter and Stutzer (2015).  
10 Data limitations prevent us from analyzing other specific occupation groups in more detail. 
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politicians matter, and thus that, e.g., the citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski 
1996 and Besley and Coate 1997) is likely to be a more appropriate description of the 
Finnish local political decision making than the median voter or Tiebout (1956) 
competition models (see also Ferreira and Gyourko 2009).  
Increased sector-specific spending cannot be automatically attributed to rent-seeking. 
One reason for this is that municipal employees are experts in their area of employment and 
can therefore provide useful information to other councilors. Such information provision 
might lead to improved decision-making. We are unable to find systematic evidence for the 
extra spending being related to rents that the politicians employed by the public sector 
potentially get from holding the office (through better employment opportunities, or greater 
wages; see e.g. Dahlberg and Mörk 2006, Brueckner and Neumark 2014). Nor do we find 
evidence that the increased spending reflects pro-social behavior or competence of public 
sector employees (e.g. Best and Cotta 2000, Francois 2000, Besley and Ghatak 2003, 
2006).  
Even though we cannot differentiate between these competing hypotheses relating to 
the efficiency of the increased spending, it is definitely noteworthy  though somewhat 
puzzling  that the Finnish municipal councilors employed by the public sector want to 
increase public expenditures in a country that in 2014 had, at 59% (OECD 2015), the 
highest public sector ratio to GDP among all OECD countries and whose local 
governments were, together with Italy’s, the second most indebted in the OECD (OECD 
2015). Viewed from this angle, Niskanen’s (1971) concerns about bureaucrats’ information 
advantage leading to excessive spending seem warranted.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
institutional setting and data. We present our econometric identification strategy in Section 
3. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2   Institutional setting and data 
2.1   Finnish local governments 
Tasks and revenue sources of municipalities: As, e.g., Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) 
describe, Finland has a two-tier system of government consisting of central government and 
municipalities as the local level. Finnish municipalities have extensive tasks. In addition to 
the usual local public goods and services, municipalities are responsible for providing most 
of social and health care services and primary and secondary education. Health care is the 
most important spending component. The GDP share of municipality spending is large 
(roughly 18 percent) and the municipalities employ around 20 percent of the total 
workforce.  
Municipalities have extensive fiscal autonomy. As for revenue sources, the most 
important tax instrument is the local income tax. The tax rate is flat and determined by the 
municipalities. In 2012, the average share of the income tax of total revenue was 46 
percent. Property and corporate taxes are less important, as in 2012 they accounted for 
about 3 percent of total revenue, respectively.  
There are large regional tax base and cost disparities which are offset by a central 
government grant system. This nationwide leveling is based on estimates of average costs 
and tax revenues. The municipalities cannot influence the amount of grants received. The 
grant system covers about 20 percent of the total municipal revenues, but this share varies a 
great deal. For every fourth municipality, the system accounts for more than half of the 
revenues.  
Decision-making and elections in municipalities: Municipalities are governed by a 
municipality council which is the most important political actor. For example, mayors are 
public officials chosen by the councils and have only limited and only executive power. 
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Moreover, municipal boards (i.e., cabinets) have only a preparatory role and the 
representation in the boards follows the same proportional political distribution as the 
representation in the council.  
Municipal elections are held simultaneously in all municipalities and each 
municipality has one electoral district. The elections in our data were held at the fourth 
Sundays of October in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008.11 The council term starts the next year 
and lasts four years: E.g., the council elected in 1996 is in power in 1997-2000.  
Within each municipality, the seat allocation is based on the proportional 
representation, as determined by the open list D’Hondt election rule. In an election, each 
voter gives a single vote to a single candidate and the voters cannot vote for a party without 
specifying a candidate, even though each candidate has an affiliation to a party list. The 
total number of votes over the candidates in a given party list determines the votes for each 
party. The entire vector of these party votes for all parties determine how many seats each 
party gets according to the D’Hondt rule. Given these party seats, the competition for the 
seats within parties is simply an n-past-the-post rule. In this setting, voters (as opposed to 
parties) decide which candidates are elected from a given party-list, because the rank of the 
candidates within the party-list is fully determined by the amount of votes that the 
candidates on the list get.   
There are restrictions on the political roles of municipal employees. First, a municipal 
employee who is in an executive position in some branch of public service production 
cannot be a council member. For example, the director of a municipality’s school authority 
cannot be a member of the municipal council. Second, a municipal employee cannot be a 
member of the sub-committee of his own specific sector. For example, a teacher cannot be 
a member of the sub-committee for education. Third, a municipal employee working in 
                                                 
11 We do not use 2012 elections because the outcome data are not yet available.  
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administrative duties directly under the municipal board cannot be a member of the board. 
Fourth, a municipal employee who is the presenting official for matters dealt by the 
municipal board cannot be a member of the board. 
The broader institutional context may also limit the opportunities of the municipal 
employees to influence outcomes while in office. For example, wages are largely set at the 
national-level wage bargaining between the municipal employer organization (Local 
Government Employers KT) and various labor unions. However, individual municipalities 
can pay more than agreed upon nationally, and sometimes they do: for example rural 
municipalities often need to attract doctors and other specialists with higher salaries. 
 
2.2   Data 
Our data come from a number of sources and refers to individual candidates (politicians) 
and municipalities.  
Candidate and elections data: We have obtained data on municipal elections held 
between 1996 and 2008 form the Ministry of justice. These data consist of candidate-level 
election results, in particular party affiliation, number of votes and elected status. The 
election data also includes the age and gender of the candidates. Information on municipal 
employment status comes from KEVA (formerly: Local Government Pensions Institution), 
and we have linked the candidate data also to Statistics Finland data on education, 
occupation and socio-economic status and to the income data from the Finnish Tax 
Authority. Overall we have 160,996 candidate-election observations. We do not have 
income data for the 1996 candidates and the education data are missing for some 
candidates.  
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The characteristics of the candidates running in municipal elections held between 
1996 and 2008 are shown in Appendix Table A1.12 For our purposes, a candidate is a 
municipal employee, if she was employed by a municipality at the end of the election 
year.13 Compared to other candidates, municipal employees are more often female (nurse is 
the most common profession among them), classified as high professionals in their 
socioeconomic status and running for the Social Democratic Party. These observable 
differences in candidate characteristics may confound our econometric analysis, despite the 
estimations being conducted at the municipality level (see e.g. Clots-Figueras 2011). We 
return to this issue when we present our econometric approach in detail. 
Municipal data: We use Statistics Finland’s data on municipal expenditures and 
demographics for years 1996–2012.  
Appendix Table A2 reports the summary statistics of municipality and municipal 
council characteristics, calculated using 1544 municipality-council term observations. On 
average, municipalities’ total expenditures are 5500 euros per capita. The single most 
important expenditure category is health care (1,700 euros per capita). Municipal 
employees’ seat share is on average 26.4%. 
 
3   Econometric approach 
3.1   Identification strategy 
To estimate the effect of political representation of municipal employees on municipal 
policy, we use the following regression specification:  
 
                                                 
12 We omit 33 elections because those municipalities underwent a municipal merger during the election term. 
We also omit 2004 data for two municipalities (that merged) due to ambiguities in the candidate-level election 
data. It seems that the ambiguity results from a popular candidate being disqualified.  
13 In Table A1, 5% of the municipal employees are classified as unemployed due to differences in survey 
timing and definitions between Statistics Finland unemployment status and our municipal employee status. 
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 Ymt =  δMmt 	൅ X'mtβ +	umt,            (1) 
 
where Ymt is the outcome of interest, Mmt is the seat share of municipal employees in the 
council, X'mt is a vector of control variables (possibly lagged), and umt is the error term in 
municipality m at time t. The parameter of interest is δ, which measures the effect of a 
change in the seat share of municipal employees on the outcome. 
Our main outcome variable is municipal expenditures. A simple OLS estimation of 
equation (1) may suffer from both reverse causality and omitted variable bias. This could be 
the case if, e.g., voters in a municipality demand high level of municipal services. Such a 
municipality would have a high number of municipal employees. This calls for greater 
municipal expenditures and would show up as a greater council seat share of public sector 
employees as well.  
We employ two methods to estimate the treatment effect of interest (δ). First, we use 
an instrumental variable (IV) estimator, using a close-elections approach similar to Clots-
Figueras (2011, 2012). Our instrument measures the extent to which the seat share of 
municipal employees exceeds (or falls short of) their expected share due to randomness in 
the outcomes of the close elections. In other words, the instrument obtains higher values for 
those municipalities in which the municipal employee candidates were ‘lucky’ and smaller 
values for those municipalities in which they were ‘unlucky’. Second, to preserve power, 
we will invoke the structure of our estimation problem which implies that the coefficient of 
our instrument in the 1st stage of the IV should in expectation be one. This feature means 
that in the reduced form of our IV of equation (1), the coefficient of the instrument ought to 
be very close to the IV estimate of δ.  
Unlike much of the recent literature on close elections, the Finnish municipal election 
system of proportional representation with open party lists does not easily render itself to a 
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simple regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis at the municipality-level (see e.g. 
Lee et al. 2004). We therefore build on Clots-Figueras (2011, 2012) who uses the fraction 
of women winning close elections as an instrument for the share of women in the 
legislature. Our procedure uses as-good-as random variation at candidate-level in the close 
elections and aggregates this variation to a municipality-level instrumental variable. To 
properly capture the treatment effect of political representation of municipal employees on 
municipal expenditures, we focus on closeness within party lists. This choice means that 
between-party changes do not confound our results. For example, if municipal employees 
are more often left- than right-wing, between party comparisons would give us the joint 
effect of municipal employees and party status.14  
We construct our instrument in the following steps: 
Step 1: For each party list p, we define the pivotal number of votes as the average of 
the maximum number of votes among the non-elected candidates and the minimum number 
of votes among the elected candidates. The distance to getting elected for each candidate is 
the number of votes of the candidate minus the pivotal number of votes of her party list. We 
normalize this distance by dividing it by the total number of votes of the party list and then 
multiply it by 100. We denote the variable thus obtained vipmt.15 Closeness of each candidate 
i in party list p in municipality m in election t, Cipmt, is then defined as 
 
 Cipmt = ൜1 if |vipmt|≤ε0 if |vipmt|>ε	,                              (2) 
 
                                                 
14 A small number of recent studies have explored close contests that take place within parties in proportional 
elections in Finland: Kotakorpi et al. (2016) use them to study the returns to holding political office. Hyytinen 
et al. (2014) study incumbency advantage and evaluate the performance of close elections RDD using the 
same Finnish local elections that we study here. Unlike these prior papers, we are interested in municipal level 
outcomes.  
15 Note that vipmt cannot be defined for party lists where none of the candidates get elected or all of the 
candidates get elected. In total, this means that approximately 4800 candidate-election observations are left 
out. 
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where ε is some small bandwidth, expressed in percentages (e.g., ε = 0.4 means “0.4 %”; 
that is, 4 votes out of 1000). Due to randomness in the outcomes of elections, candidates 
just above and below the pivotal number do not differ systematically from each other. 
Indeed, when ε = 0 in our data, there was a tie within a party list between two (or more) 
candidates at the threshold of getting into the council. In such a case, a lottery decides 
which of the candidates are elected (see Hyytinen et al. 2014 for details). There are 1351 
candidates who end up in these lotteries and 335 of them are municipal employees.  
Step 2: Quasi-randomization taking place within each party list influences how many 
municipal employees get elected from each list. To capture this list-level variation, we 
calculate the difference between the realized outcome and the expected outcome of the 
close races within each party.16 Formally, this can expressed as 
 
 ௣ܶ௠௧= ቀ∑ ܥ௜௣௠௧ܦ௜௣௠௧ே೛௜ ܯ௜௣௠௧ቁ െ ቈ
∑ ஼೔೛೘೟ಿ೛೔ ெ೔೛೘೟
∑ ஼೔೛೘೟ಿ೛೔
∑ ܥ௜௣௠௧ܦ௜௣௠௧ே೛௜ ቉,     (3) 
 
where Mipmt is equal to 1 if candidate i is a municipal employee and zero otherwise, Dipmt 
equals 1, if candidate i in municipality m was elected in the election t, and zero otherwise 
and p refers to a party list and Np to the number of candidates in the list p. The first term is 
the number of municipal employees that are elected in the close elections. The second term 
is the expected number of municipal employees who get elected in the close elections. The 
expected number comes from a hypergeometric distribution, because close elections can be 
seen as a basic urn problem.17 The reason for using Eq. (3) is that there may be more than 
                                                 
16 Simply “adding up” candidate level treatments would not be appropriate. To see why, consider three 
municipal employees who are close and compete for one seat. There is no useful variation at the party level in 
this case, because the outcome cannot be anything else but a municipal employee getting elected. 
17 In an urn problem, the expected value is n(K/N) (both with and without replacement), where n is the 
number of available close seats, K the number of close municipal employees and N the number of close 
candidates. 
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two candidates that are close and thus subject to randomization and any number of the close 
candidates can be municipal employees. Moreover, the set of candidates defined as close 
may compete for more than one seat within the party list. These features are the main 
difference between our and Clots-Figueras’ (2011, 2012) approach, because she considers 
only situations where one male and one female candidate compete for one seat (and where 
there is thus no need to consider the expected number of elected municipal employees when 
constructing the instrument). 
Step 3: We aggregate the random variation at the party list-level to construct a 
municipal-level instrumental variable, Tmt. This is done by adding up Tpmt over all the party 
lists within a municipality and by dividing the sum by council size (CS): 
 
 Tmt =100*(∑ ௣ܶ௠௧ሻ/ܥܵ௠௧௣ .                   (4) 
 
Our instrument, Tmt, captures the extent to which the seat share of municipal 
employees exceeds (Tmt > 0) or falls short of (Tmt < 0) their expected share due to 
randomness in the outcomes of the close elections. If, in a given municipality, municipal 
employees were lucky within one party list and equally unlucky in another, the treatment at 
the municipal-level would be zero. One can think of Tmt as the part of the variation in Mmt 
that is as-good-as random. Our IV approach thus assumes that Tmt is a determinant of Mmt, 
i.e. the (actual) seat share of municipal employees in the council and uncorrelated with umt 
in (1). This assumption can to an extent be tested using municipality-level covariate balance 
tests. Moreover, the candidate-level bandwidth can be used to check the robustness of the 
results to the bandwidth choice.  
Empirically, Tmt appears to work as expected (see Appendix A for details of these 
analyses): First of all, it is symmetrically distributed around zero. Moreover, when the seat 
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share of municipal employees increases due to randomness in the outcomes of the close 
elections (i.e., when Tmt increases by one unit), so does their actual share (i.e., Mmt). This 
implies that the coefficient of Tmt in the 1st stage of the IV should be close to one.18 As we 
show in Appendix B, this is indeed empirically the case in our data. Finally, even with the 
smallest possible bandwidth (ε = 0), we have variation in Tmt. The reason for this is that 
there are many parties in each municipality and many ties. Thus, lotteries can take place in 
any one of them. As we increase the bandwidth, almost all of the municipalities in our data 
have a close contest within at least one of its party lists. For example, for bandwidth ε = 0.4, 
we observe either a positive or a negative treatment (as captured by Tmt) in 1145 
municipalities out of 1544. This does not imply that we would use all the variation in the 
municipal employee council seat share in the data for these 1145 municipalities: We only 
use the random part of the variation in the seat share (as explained above) for identification 
of δ.  
Two final points about the procedure of constructing our instrument are worth 
mentioning. First, there is an RDD flavor to our approach. However, we do not have a well-
defined forcing variable at the municipality level (even though we have one at the 
individual candidate level). Second, our procedure can be adapted to other political systems 
and settings. For example, it can be used to analyze party effects in plurality systems, where 
quasi-randomization takes place within districts  and where such variation needs to be 
aggregated.  
 
                                                 
18 The first stage coefficient equals unity only asymptotically, because municipal employee candidates may be 
lucky in municipalities where their council share would otherwise have been low (and vice versa). 
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3.2   Validity tests 
In Table 1, we report the covariance balance tests for the narrowest possible bandwidth (ε = 
0) and the largest bandwidth that we use in the regressions (ε = 0.4).19 The smaller 
bandwidth leads to less precise estimates, because there is less variation in Tmt, but the 
assumption of “as-good-as random assignment” is more plausible for it. We divide the data 
into two groups, based on the seat share of municipal employees exceeding (Tmt > 0) or 
falling short of (Tmt < 0) its expectation. 
According to Table 1, the pre-treatment variables are well balanced, including the 
lagged total expenditures, the lagged municipal employee share in the council and its 
lagged instrument. This means that the municipalities where the municipal employees won, 
by chance, more seats are very similar to the municipalities where municipal employees 
lost, by chance, seats to other occupation groups.20 
Table 2 reports balance tests on council characteristics for the current election term.21 
We should take a closer look at them, because municipal employees are more often female 
and have higher socioeconomic status than the candidates that have other employment 
status (cf. Table 1). As Panel A of Table 2 shows, the post-treatment council characteristics 
are well balanced. For example, the municipal employees that by chance won a seat from a 
candidate from another occupation are of no better or worse quality (see Ferreira and 
Gyourko 2014 who argue that e.g. gender discrimination would imply that candidates with 
the same number of votes would be of different quality), as measured by their incumbency 
                                                 
19 The number of observations varies because we do not observe some of the pre-treatment variables for the 
1996 election term. For example, we do not have the 1992 individual level election data. Furthermore, due to 
a structural data break in 1997, we do not have comparable expenditure measures for 1993–1996. 
20 We also test covariate balance using regression that controls for year fixed effects. When ε = 0.4, the null 
hypothesis of balance is rejected only for two variables (Coalition Party seat share and Council size) at the 5% 
significance level. Due to multiple testing, this cannot be taken as a sign of imbalance: the number of 
rejections is no more than would be expected at the chosen level of significance.  
21 The post-treatment balance of parties’ seat shares are by definition balanced, because our treatment is based 
on within party close contests (see Appendix B). 
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and education. The only exception to the good balance is the councils’ gender composition. 
This finding mirrors the strong positive correlation between gender and occupation status at 
the candidate-level. The imbalance is not, however, a result of failed randomization, but 
rather an intrinsic feature of municipal employees: When a municipal employee is 
randomly allocated into a council, a female is more likely to get a seat in the council.  
Our candidate-level data allows a closer look at the gender imbalance. In Panel B of 
Table 2, we report the balance tests based on gender. For these tests, we divide the 
municipal election observations into two groups, depending on whether the seat share of 
females exceeds or falls short of its expected share. The procedure we used to calculate this 
gender difference between the realization and outcomes is the same as the one we used for 
the municipal employees. As the table reveals, the councils that have by chance more 
females than males also have more municipal employees, but there is no imbalance in the 
other observed characteristics. In Panel C and D of Table 2, we divide municipal employees 
into two categories: those who work in the health care sector and those who work in the 
remaining (non-health) care sectors. We use this division, because the health care sector is 
the largest single expenditure category of the Finnish municipalities. The division also 
allows us to analyze whether the positive correlation between municipal employment status 
and gender is driven by the health care sector employees. This would be intuitive, because 
nursing is a female-dominated occupation. From Panel C and D of Table 2, it is indeed 
evident that the gender imbalance is related to employees in the health care sector. We 
explore the importance of gender for our econometric findings in greater detail below.  
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Table 1. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality-level.  
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 68 5 316 956 75 5 323 838 -7 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 68 1 600 352 75 1 653 370 -53 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 68 3 716 795 75 3 670 663 46 
Population 109 8 524 14 144 118 8 835 11 398 -311 
Young inhabitants % 109 18.83 3.67 118 18.67 3.04 0.16 
Old inhabitants % 109 18.05 4.61 118 18.02 4.61 0.03 
Council size 109 27.75 9.32 118 27.88 10.05 -1.17 
Municipal employees % 68 28.69 14.07 75 27.75 11.50 0.93 
Instrument for municipal employees 68 0.00 0.08 75 -0.08 0.08 0.08 
Municipal health care employees % 68 7.72 5.50 75 7.50 4.49 0.22 
Municipal non-health care employees % 68 20.97 12.11 75 20.25 10.69 0.72 
Incumbents % 68 56.65 7.57 75 57.11 9.40 -3.76 
Women % 68 34.02 9.63 75 34.08 8.36 -0.06 
High professionals % 68 18.73 11.42 75 19.56 10.11 -0.83 
University educated % 68 11.65 7.43 75 10.57 7.62 1.08 
Unemployed % 68 2.81 3.21 75 3.98 4.48 -1.17* 
Center Party seat share % 109 40.49 20.08 118 40.53 19.50 -0.03 
Coalition Party seat share % 109 16.13 9.63 118 16.07 10.17 0.06 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 109 19.97 10.92 118 21.30 10.73 -1.33 
Green party seat share % 109 1.89 3.22 118 1.53 3.43 0.36 
Left Alliance seat share % 109 9.49 8.83 118 8.90 8.76 0.59 
Swedish Party seat share % 109 3.25 13.82 118 3.79 15.75 -0.54 
True Finns seat share % 109 2.33 4.70 118 2.11 4.08 0.22 
Christian Democrats seat share % 109 3.01 3.89 118 2.73 3.62 0.28 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 404 5 334 828 406 5 327 818 7 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 404 1 631 392 403 1 636 359 -5 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 404 3 703 679 403 3 691 654 12 
Population 588 17 488 46 681 557 13 548 33 128 3 939 
Young inhabitants % 588 18.67 3.29 557 18.63 3.26 0.04 
Old inhabitants % 588 17.52 4.65 557 17.90 4.42 -0.38 
Council size 588 31.91 11.81 557 30.55 10.80 1.35 
Municipal employees % 404 28.38 13.49 403 27.69 12.99 0.70 
Instrument for municipal employees 404 0.17 0.10 404 0.02 0.10 0.15 
Municipal health care employees % 404 7.43 5.06 403 7.09 4.81 0.35 
Municipal non-health care employees % 404 20.95 12.71 403 20.60 12.09 0.35 
Incumbents % 404 58.12 8.54 403 57.20 9.06 0.92 
Women % 404 33.69 9.02 403 33.12 8.45 0.57 
High professionals % 404 23.07 12.84 403 21.79 11.90 1.28 
University educated % 404 14.32 10.20 403 12.70 9.63 1.61 
Unemployed % 404 3.81 3.79 403 3.58 4.03 0.23 
Center Party seat share % 588 36.83 21.08 557 37.95 21.26 -1.11 
Coalition Party seat share % 588 17.15 10.07 557 15.94 10.15 1.21 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 588 21.70 11.83 557 21.55 11.56 0.15 
Green party seat share % 588 2.40 3.94 557 1.92 3.52 0.48 
Left Alliance seat share % 588 9.19 8.64 557 8.85 8.39 0.34 
Swedish Party seat share % 588 4.54 16.16 557 5.70 18.47 -1.16 
True Finns seat share % 588 1.84 3.92 557 1.63 3.77 0.20 
Christian Democrats seat share % 588 3.04 3.65 557 3.08 3.61 -0.04 
Notes: The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the 
municipality-level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table 2. Post-treatment council covariate balance.  
ε = 0.4 Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
Panel A: All municipal employees N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 588 57.26 9.16 557 57.29 8.85 -0.04 
Female % 588 34.72 8.76 557 33.18 8.40 1.54** 
High professionals % 588 23.34 12.84 557 22.06 11.83 1.27 
University educated % 588 14.57 10.72 557 13.47 10.07 1.11 
Unemployed % 588 3.47 3.88 557 3.43 3.99 0.04 
Panel B: Female N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 596 57.12 8.62 674 56.92 9.35 0.20 
Municipal employees % 596 27.62 12.44 674 26.33 12.26 1.28* 
High professionals % 596 21.71 12.15 674 22.46 12.17 -0.75 
University educated % 596 13.44 10.27 674 13.55 10.20 -0.10 
Unemployed % 596 3.63 4.06 674 3.34 3.92 0.29 
Panel C: Municipal health care employees N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 305 57.58 8.83 319 58.13 8.88 -0.55 
Women % 305 35.86 7.69 319 33.86 8.53 2.00** 
High professionals % 305 25.47 13.47 319 24.11 12.47 1.36 
University educated % 305 16.35 11.44 319 15.38 10.74 0.98 
Unemployed % 305 3.16 3.43 319 3.22 3.88 -0.06 
Panel D: Municipal non-health employees N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference
Incumbents % 522 57.25 9.09 496 57.48 8.95 -0.24 
Women % 522 34.45 8.84 496 33.62 8.47 0.83 
High professionals % 522 24.02 12.80 496 22.66 12.43 1.36 
University educated % 522 14.67 10.79 496 14.03 10.59 0.64 
Unemployed % 522 3.61 3.93 496 3.35 3.87 0.26 
Notes: In Panel A, the treatment groups are based on all municipal employees. In Panel B, the groups are 
based on gender.  In Panel C, the groups are based on health care sector employees. In Panel D, the groups are 
based on those municipal employees who do not work in the health care sector.  The bandwidth in each case 
is 0.4. The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the 
municipality level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
4    Results 
4.1 Treatment effect on total expenditures 
We start by analyzing the effect of the share of municipal employees in the council on the 
(log) per capita total expenditures of the local government, measured as the average over 
the four year council term.  
Preliminary regression results: To have a point of comparison, we report both naïve 
OLS results with different sets of controls (Panel A of Table 3) and the IV results (Panel B 
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of Table 3) and the reduced form of IV (Panel C of Table 3), using the narrowest possible 
bandwidth with ε = 0. The OLS estimations obviously do not correct for the potential 
endogeneity of the seat share of the municipal employees, while the latter two ought to do 
that very well. The difference between the four columns of each panel is that they include 
successively more controls. We use lags (means over the t–1 election term) of the control 
variables to avoid the possible problem of introducing bad controls (i.e. alternative 
outcomes) in the models.  
As the first three columns of Panel A of Table 3 show, the OLS estimations suggest a 
positive and statistically significant association between the political representation of 
public employees and total expenditures. This association vanishes completely once we 
include a second order polynomial of the vote share of municipal employees (see column 
4). This is not unexpected, because the municipal employees’ vote and seat shares are 
highly correlated. While insignificant, the point estimates from the IV (Panel B) and the 
reduced form of IV (Panel C) estimations provide us with three important empirical 
insights: First, the IV point estimates are positive and larger in magnitude than the OLS 
estimates. Second, if our instrument is as-good-as random, the only implication of having 
more control variables in the model ought to be that they reduce residual variance. This 
what the results reported in Panel B and C bear out: The magnitude of the IV estimates do 
not change (much) when the municipal employee vote share is controlled for. This finding 
indicates that unlike OLS, the IV estimates are not confounded by voter preferences. 
Moreover, the standard errors of the estimates tend to get smaller when more controls are 
added. Third, the results reported in Panel B and C suggest that the limited amount of 
variation in the instrument is a potential problem with using the narrowest possible 
bandwidth (ε = 0). If so, the first-stage regressions may suffer from low power, especially 
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when fewer controls are included. This is indeed what we observe: The first stage F-tests 
become larger when we control for the municipal employee vote share (see column (8)).  
 
Table 3. Results for total expenditures: OLS and IV analysis with ε = 0. 
Panel A: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0016*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** -0.0003 
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0007] 
R2 0.29 0.43 0.58 0.58 
Panel B: IV, ε = 0 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 0.0058 0.0046 0.0070 0.0048 
[0.0110] [0.0103] [0.0087] [0.0042] 
First stage F 2.01 1.98 2.44 35.23 
Panel C: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Municipal employees 0.0024 0.0019 0.0031 0.0041 
[0.0047] [0.0042] [0.0036] [0.0036] 
R2 0.29 0.42 0.57 0.58 
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality-level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties’ lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
Vote share includes a second order polynomial of the municipal employees vote share. The first stage F-
statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic.  ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 
10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
Main regression results: To explore whether we can estimate the (apparently 
positive) effect of political representation of municipal employees on municipal 
expenditures more precisely, we use the wider bandwidth of ε = 0.4. The wider bandwidth 
allows us to bring in more variation from the close elections. These results are reported in 
Table 4, where Panel A reports our IV estimates and Panel B our reduced form estimates. 
The estimations that rely on the wider bandwidths can be taken to be more reliable if they 
produce a point estimate that is similar in magnitude to that produced by the narrowest 
bandwidth and if the effect can be estimated with greater precision (smaller standard error).  
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Table 4. Results for total expenditures: IV analysis with ε = 0.4. 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0034* 0.0046*** 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
[0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0016]    
First stage F 56.79 59.91 59.65 288.9 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 0.0032* 0.0043*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 
[0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0014]    
R2 0.29 0.42 0.57 0.58 
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality-level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
Vote share includes a second order polynomial of the municipal employees vote share. The first stage F-
statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 
10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
Starting from the IV estimates in Panel A of Table 4, we find across all specifications 
a statistically significant treatment effect of 0.0034-0.0041 on the municipal spending from 
having a larger share of municipal employees in the council. The reduced form results in 
Panel B echo the IV findings: They yield treatment effect estimates that are statistically 
significant and very similar to those obtained with IV, but somewhat smaller in magnitude. 
It is especially noteworthy that both estimators deliver point estimates that are very close to 
those we obtained using the narrowest possible bandwidth (ε = 0.0; see Panel B in Table 3). 
The fact that the reduced form estimates are a little smaller in absolute value than the IV 
estimates suggests that the first stage coefficient of the instrument is close to, but somewhat 
smaller than, one (as it often is; see Appendix B). It is comforting to report that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the 1st stage coefficient of the instrument is unity. 
The point estimates of Table 4 suggest that increasing municipal employees’ seat 
share by 1 percentage point increases per capita total expenditures annually by circa 0.4 % 
over one election term. As one seat is on average 3 percentage points of the total number of 
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seats, the overall average effect of an increase of one seat is roughly (at least) 1%. Because 
the average annual municipal spending is around 5600 Euros per capita, this effect 
translates into around 60 euros per capita. The effect is surprisingly large given that there 
are non-negligible institutional restrictions on the political representation of the municipal 
employees and that we are identifying the effect at a potentially unimportant of margin of 
allocating the last seats to the council.   
A closer look at gender effects: Do municipal employees increase public 
expenditures because they are more often female or because there is a municipal employee 
effect independent of gender? To address this question, we directly control for the seat 
share of females, Fmt. We instrument this (potentially endogenous) share by the share of 
females who were randomly elected in the close contests. This instrument is calculated 
using the procedure that produced the instrument for the share of municipal employees. We 
hence treat Fmt symmetrically to Mmt, i.e., either instrument it or replace it in the reduced 
form directly with the instrument. When Fmt is included in the model, we get at the effect of 
electing a municipal employee while keeping the gender composition constant. The effect 
then refers to either electing a male municipal employee instead of a male with another 
occupation or a female municipal employee instead of a female with another occupation. 
When included and properly instrumented, Fmt in turn captures the treatment effect of 
randomly electing a woman instead of a man into the council, keeping the share of 
municipal employees constant. 
We have reproduced the estimations of Table 4, but with the seat share of females 
included (see Appendix B). Somewhat surprisingly, adding the seat share of females has 
only a minor impact on the treatment effect estimate of the municipal employees: With IV, 
we find a statistically significant treatment effect of 0.0032 – 0.0035; with the reduced form 
model the corresponding figures are 0.0030 – 0.0031. In contrast to Chattopadhyay and 
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Duflo (2004) and Clots-Figueras (2011), who find that increased female participation 
matter for the type of public spending in India, we find no robust effects from (randomly) 
increased female political participation, especially when the full set of controls is included. 
An obvious explanation for this weaker and less robust female effect is that women’s 
position in Finland and India are quite different. They are well represented in the Finnish 
political decision making to start with. Indeed, Finland was third in the world to allow 
female suffrage in 1906 and in our data, the share of female councilors is relatively high, at 
about 40%.22  
Robustness checks: We have explored the robustness of our main findings and their 
internal and external validity in a number of ways (see Appendix B).  
First, the choice of bandwidth ε = 0.4 for our main analysis is somewhat ad hoc. The 
point estimates of the municipal employee effect are stable across a wide range of 
bandwidths and statistically significant for the larger bandwidths from ε = 0.24 onwards.  
Second, our main results are based on the entire sample of 1544 municipality-election 
period observations, even though the instrument can be different from zero only within the 
chosen bandwidths. This choice may lead to a selection bias if the municipalities implicitly 
chosen by the bandwidth choice are different from those that remain outside the 
bandwidths. We have therefore replicated the results of Table 4 using only those 
observations in which close elections take place. This amounts to omitting the observations 
for which the instrument variable is zero. The point estimates from these estimations are 
almost identical to those reported in Table 4, but standard errors are slightly larger. The 
estimates nonetheless are mostly statistically significant.  
                                                 
22 Some research have found a positive correlation between female political representation and public 
spending in countries more similar to Finland, but typically not using research designs that plausibly identify 
causal effects (see e.g. Svaleryd 2009). 
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Third, we have analyzed the expenditure effects separately for each year instead of 
the mean over the whole council term. These by-year estimates are all significant, similar in 
magnitude to what we reported earlier and stable over the council term (no within-term 
trend). We have also run by year placebo regressions (four years prior to the council term of 
interest), and the estimates are insignificant as they should. However, the expenditure effect 
is somewhat persistent, as it is different from zero and significant for two years after the 
council term ends. The effect becomes insignificant by the third post-term year.  
Fourth, we have also constructed the instrument using placebo thresholds of getting 
elected within the party lists. Reassuringly, neither the first nor the second stage IV 
estimates are significantly different from zero when using any of these placebo thresholds.  
Finally, we have explored the covariate balance in the close sample (as defined by the 
choice of bandwidth ε) and the rest of the municipalities. For example, for ε = 0 the 
covariates balance perfectly. On the other hand, for ε = 0.4, the close sample is different 
from the other municipalities, because much larger municipalities select into the close 
sample.23 However, it is unlikely that this selection compromises the validity of our 
findings, because our point estimates are robust to changing the bandwidth.  
 
4.2 Mechanisms 
Our results show that even though the councilors that we use to identify the municipal 
employee effect are marginal, they do influence local public spending. This is intriguing, 
because one could argue that these councilors are not the most influential or prominent 
members of the council. Moreover, the non-elected marginal candidates are typically vice-
                                                 
23 The reason for this is that we define the bandwidth within parties in vote shares. This means that even the 
bandwidth of 0.4 (4 votes out of 1000) is very small. For example, with a two vote distance to the threshold, 
the party list needs to be larger than 500 votes for the candidate to be within the bandwidth. Such small 
bandwidths realize more often in larger municipalities, because in them, the total number of party votes is 
large enough to generate small vote shares. 
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councilors who get to attend council meetings if the councilor is absent or may get a 
council seat if elected councilors step down. The vice-councilors are sometimes given 
positions also in the municipal sub-committees. We have also shown that the result is not 
driven by the gender of the elected municipal employees. How, then, does our surprisingly 
large effect come about?  
We are able to rule out a number of possibilities: First, we can rule out that the 
marginally elected municipal employee councilors would lead to them having a majority in 
the council or to their party becoming dominated by municipal employees: Such instances 
are present in the data only very rarely. This suggests that a direct voting mechanism is 
unlikely to explain the increase in spending.24 Second, the municipal employee effect 
appears not to be larger in the municipalities where the marginally elected councilor was 
the only elected municipal employee from his/her party (not reported). Moreover, instances 
where there would be only one municipal employee in the entire council are very rare in the 
data. Finally, the increase in the municipal employee representation apparently does not 
increase the probability that a political leader (chairman of the council board or chairman of 
the council) would be a municipal employee (not reported).  
Even though the marginally elected councilors are probably not the most prominent 
members of the council, could they have a disproportionate effect within and thus via their 
party? To consider this possibility, we look at the heterogeneity of the spending effect by 
party, in particular, whether the effect is different within the largest party than within the 
second largest party. We report these results in Table 5, where again Panel A reports the IV 
estimates and Panel B the reduced form estimates. We find a significant effect for the 
largest party. In contrast, the estimates are smaller and insignificant for the second largest 
party. This result bears on the literature on coalitional bargaining (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 
                                                 
24 Furthermore, a single councilor is fairly unlikely to be pivotal in council with a median size of 27 
councilors often enough in our data to explain our findings. 
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2005), as it indicates that non-partisan interest groups, such as municipal employees, may 
be able to influence decision making within the party. If this party is large, the non-partisan 
interest groups may have a disproportionate effect on the policy.25 
  
Table 5. Heterogeneity in the total expenditures effect by party size 
  Largest party 2nd largest party 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) 
Municipal employees 0.0048**  0.0022 
[0.0019]    [0.0034] 
First stage F 78.78 43.57 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0049**  0.0020 
[0.0020]    [0.0032] 
R2 0.57 0.57 
N 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality-level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
First stage F-statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
To shed further light on the potential mechanisms of influence, we explore whether 
the link is occupation specific. It is certainly plausible that municipal employees have more 
information on their own employment sector. However, there is no reason why, for 
example, a teacher would have better information about the appropriate level of health care 
spending than an otherwise similar councilor from the private sector. In columns (1) and (3) 
of Table 6, the outcome variable is municipal expenditures that are not related to health 
care, whereas in columns (2) and (4) of the panels the outcome variable is health care 
                                                 
25 We should note that the Centre Party is most often the largest party in the Finnish municipalities, due to its 
considerable support in the smaller rural municipalities (which constitute the bulk of municipalities). 
Therefore, the effect captured in Table 5 may be a Centre Party phenomenon rather than a more general party 
size effect.  
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expenditures.26 In these models, the interpretation for the coefficient for municipal health 
care employees is that it mirrors the effect of increasing their seat share relative to any non-
municipal employee occupation. All the specifications include year fixed effects as well as 
the party and municipality controls (i.e., the specification is the same as in column (3) and 
(7) of Table 4). The method of estimation is IV in Panel A, and Panel B presents the 
corresponding reduced form of IV estimates.27 
As can be seen from the table, the results suggest that health care employees increase 
health care expenditures, but non-health care employees have no effect on them. Similarly, 
health care employees do not affect non-health care expenditures, but municipal employees 
in the sectors other than health increase the other (non-health) municipal expenditures. 
Spending increases thus seem to be confined to the sectors that have, by chance, more 
representation through municipal employees in the municipal council. These results are 
similar also if we run the analysis by party size or if we add the seat share of females to the 
models (see Appendix D).   
Consistent with the posited information advantage of bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971, 
Romer and Rosenthal 1979), these results suggest that information advantage of the 
municipal employees of their own employment sector makes it possible for them to 
influence spending patterns. Given that councilors with municipal employment cannot be 
members of the sub-committee of their own sector, they have to influence sector-specific 
spending indirectly. Intra-party bargaining is an example of an indirect mechanism that can 
generate the observed sector specific effects. These results also largely rule out the 
                                                 
26 We cannot easily disaggregate other spending into more specific categories, such as schooling, because the 
data get sparse (i.e., candidates at finer level occupations are involved in close elections too infrequently for 
empirical analysis).   
27 The results for pre-treatment covariate balance tests and the first stage estimations of the IV are presented in 
Appendix C.  
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explanation that municipal employees increase spending because they generally prefer a 
larger public sector.  
The results reported in Table 6 are robust to adding the seat share of females to the 
models (see Appendix C). The results for the non-health care expenditures are also robust 
to using other bandwidth choices. However, the effect of the seat share of municipal health 
care employees on health spending is less robust in this regard.  
 
Table 6. Results according to occupation and spending category. 
  Outcome: non health 
care expenditures 
Outcome: health care 
expenditures 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0045** 0.0016 
[0.0021] [0.0036]    
Municipal health care employees 0.0033 0.0081**  
[0.0033] [0.0039]    
First stage F 29.73 29.57 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0044** 0.0019 
[0.0021] [0.0035]    
Municipal health care employees 0.0025 0.0076**  
[0.0031] [0.0036]    
R2 0.44 0.18 
N 1544 1534 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality-level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality 
controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. First stage F-
statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 
10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
 
4.4. Evidence on rent-seeking 
The results reported so far are consistent with bureaucrats having information advantage 
over politicians and thus being able to convince politicians to spend more on public 
services. It is not easy, however, to determine whether the documented increased sector-
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specific spending is due to rent-seeking. Because municipal employees are experts in their 
area of employment, they may be able to provide useful information to other councilors. 
This mechanism ought to lead to better, not worse spending decisions.  
Our data do not allow us to conclusively determine which type of spending is useful 
for citizens, or which spending is more likely to be excessive and related to rent-seeking. 
We have nevertheless investigated this issue by studying whether the elected municipal 
employees receive larger salary increases and/or face a smaller unemployment risk, and 
whether they enjoy from a (larger) incumbency advantage in subsequent elections than the 
other candidates. We have also analyzed whether the political representation of municipal 
employees shows up in house prices. We explored house prices, because, e.g., Gyourko and 
Tracy (1991) argue that high levels of government rent extraction might be capitalized in 
them.  
When we use candidate-level data (either lottery outcomes that make the election 
status truly random or RDD), we find no systematic evidence that that the municipal 
employees would get higher salaries, be more likely to be employed subsequently, or that 
they would be more likely to get re-elected or get more votes (in the next election at t + 1) 
than the other candidates due to getting elected at time t (see the Appendix E for details of 
these results). Using municipal-level data on real estate transactions, we find no effect on 
house prices.  
These null results mean that we cannot rule out the use of better information in a pro-
social way, nor provide systematic evidence for rent-seeking. Using auxiliary survey data 
from the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), we have, however, confirmed that 
municipal employees who run for a council differ from the other candidates in two 
intriguing ways: Firstly, they oppose more strongly firing of municipal employees in 
connection with municipal mergers. In particular, there is a rule in Finland which prevents 
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municipalities from dismissing (redundant) employees five years after a municipal merger. 
Municipal employees who run for a council disagree more often with the statement that this 
period is too long. Secondly, they oppose more strongly restrictions on nomination of 
municipal employees in municipal boards.28 We cannot be irrefutable here, but one could 
argue that these stated views, as well as the concerns expressed in the Finnish media, are 
harder to reconcile with pro-social behavior than with rent-seeking.  
 
5 Conclusions 
We have produced three novel findings in this paper. First, the political representation of 
municipal employees has a positive (causal) effect on overall local public spending. 
Second, the effect is sector specific: Having more health care sector employees in the 
council increases health care spending and having more non-health sector employees 
increases non-health care spending, but there are no significant cross-sector effects. Since 
the spending effects are in this particular sense sector specific, we can rule out that general 
preferences for a larger public sector are driving the result. Instead, the results are likely to 
be driven by information advantage that municipal employees command relative to other 
councilors in their own sector of employment. Third, the effect appears to be related to the 
interest group influencing the political agenda within the largest parties. 
We have shown that in a municipality with a median sized council, the increase in 
local public spending is about 1 percent on average over the four-year council term. The 
effect is surprisingly large because we are probably looking at a relatively unimportant 
                                                 
28 In its recent article that dealt with the political power of public sector employees in Finnish municipal 
councils, the Finnish National Broadcasting company YLE also cited the survey answers given by municipal 
council election candidates. For example, YLE reported that “80% of those candidates that are municipal 
employees think that privatization of health services brings neither efficiency gains nor savings to 
municipalities. 67% of other candidates shared this opinion.” 
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margin (i.e., the last elected candidates within a party) and because there are restrictions on 
the political positions that the municipal employees can take.  
It is important to interpret these findings in the context to which they apply: We have 
found that the effect of having relatively more municipal employees in the council on 
public spending is not due to the increased female political participation. Moreover, our 
findings refer to a country that has a large public sector and that has traditionally given the 
local municipalities a major role in the allocation of public resources and production of 
public services. While we do not find systematic evidence of rent-seeking, our results show 
that the Finnish municipal councilors employed by the public sector want - by revealed 
preference - to increase public expenditures in a country that in 2014 had the highest public 
sector ratio to GDP and whose local governments were among the most indebted among all 
OECD countries. One can therefore raise the question why, in this context, would an 
informed and benevolent municipal employee councilor increase rather than decrease 
public spending? If the effect is, as we showed, driven by the employment sector of the 
elected councilors and if it only comes through the largest party, how would the possible 
efficiency-enhancing effects come about? These are important questions that call for further 
research on the mechanisms at work.  
Our evidence supports the view that the identities of the local politicians matter. This 
finding holds two lessons for contemporary research in economics and political science: 
First, the predictions from the median voter model or Tiebout competition appear not to fit 
local political decision making characterized by proportional representation and open list 
D’Hondt election rule. Other models, such as the citizen-candidate model (see Osborne and 
Slivinski 1996 and Besley and Coate 1997) or bureaucracy models (see e.g. Niskanen 1971 
and Romer and Rosenthal 1979), which allow the politicians’ identities to matter, are 
clearly more in line with the evidence. Second, the marginally elected candidates seem to 
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be able to influence local policy. This influence is a necessary condition for the vote of a 
rational pivotal voter to have an impact at the margin. This may explain why in the very 
same Finnish elections that we have studied in this paper, a greater likelihood of being the 
pivotal voter increases turnout (see Lyytikäinen and Tukiainen 2013).  
One can only conjecture how large effects we would have documented, if there had 
not been restrictions on political participation of public sector employees in Finland. 
Because public employees are a large interest group, their opportunities to gain political 
power and willingness to use it ought not to be overlooked. For example, fairness and 
equality considerations at the local level call for continuous monitoring of how the 
opportunities of public employees to participate in politics ought to be regulated.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and distribution of the instrument  
This appendix shows descriptive statistics on candidates and local governments, discussed 
in Section 2.2. Moreover, we show the distribution of the instrument mtT for various 
bandwidths. Figures A1 and A2 show how the variation in the treatment increases as the 
bandwidth increases but the shape of the distribution remains symmetric, thus implying 
valid randomization. 
Table A1. Candidate characteristics. 
  All 
Municipal 
employees Other 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Number of obs. 155 111 35 977 119 134 
Vote share % 1.01 1.21 1.11 1.28 0.98 1.19 
Party vote share % 6.05 11.30 6.18 10.53 6.02 11.52 
Number of votes 59.3 148.8 68.8 152.0 56.5 148 
Female 0.39 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.34 0.47 
Age 46.2 12.3 45.1 10.5 46.6 12.8 
Incumbent 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 
Wage income (€) 20 307 26 245 22 625 13 129 19 563 29 190 
Capital income (€) 1 864 23 056 881 5 153 2 179 26 327 
High professional 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.37 
Unemployed 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 
University degree 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 
Coalition Party 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.40 
Social Dem. Party 0.22 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.40 
Center Party 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 
True Finns 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.18 
Green Party 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 
Left Alliance 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 
Swedish Party 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Christian Dem. 
Party 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 
Other parties 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23 
Notes: Income data are not available for 2012 elections, and in 1996 elections they are available only for 
candidates who run also in 2000, 2004 or 2008 elections (number of observations 96040 for the whole 
sample, 23317 for municipal employees and 72723 for other candidates). We use 1995 occupation data for the 
elections held in 1996. Due to missing data, the number of observations for high professional and 
unemployment status are 155035, 23317, 72723, and for university degree 122720, 31247, 91473, 
respectively. 
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Table A2. Summary statistics for municipal and council data. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. 
Municipality characteristics     
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 5,564 999 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 1,699 409 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 3,865 822 
Population 12,912 36,999 
Young inhabitants % 17.7 3.52 
Old inhabitants % 19.5 4.90 
Council composition     
Council size 29.1 11.3 
Municipal employees % 26.4 12.3 
Municipal health care workers % 7.02 5.11 
Municipal non health care workers % 19.40 11.43 
Incumbents % 56.9 9.22 
Women % 33.9 8.93 
High professionals % 20.9 11.9 
University educated % 12.6 9.9 
Unemployed % 3.54 4.02 
Center Party seat share % 40.5 21.2 
Coalition Party seat share % 16.3 10.9 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 19.6 11.3 
Green party seat share % 1.88 3.52 
Left Alliance seat share % 7.82 8.01 
Swedish Party seat share % 5.33 18.1 
True Finns seat share % 1.75 4.13 
Christian Democrats seat share % 2.99 3.94 
Other parties seat share % 3.87 9.05 
Notes: Unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. Number of observations is 1544. 
Municipality characteristics are calculated as means over the four year council term. Young inhabitants refer 
to the age group of 0-17 year old and old to 64+ year old.  
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Figure A1. Distribution of mtT . 
 
Figure A2. Distribution of mtT (excluding zeros). 
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Appendix B: Robustness and validity of the total expenditures effect  
 
We present here a number of additional results: First, we report the first stage of our IV 
across a range of bandwidths as well as show post-treatment balance for more variables 
than in the main text. Second, we report the robustness tests for the municipal employee 
results (reported in Table 6 of the main text) over a range of bandwidths. Third, we analyze 
the expenditure effects separately for each year. Fourth, we compare our close elections 
sample to the other municipalities and report the robustness of the results to using only the 
close sample. Fifth, we report results for the IV regression that accounts for the correlation 
between municipal employee status and gender. In this IV regression, we instrument also 
the female seat share in the council using the instrument constructed for close contests 
between female and male. Finally, we report tests for the validity of the female instrument.  
One can check whether our aggregation procedure produces a correct municipality 
level instrument by running the first stage of IV and checking whether the coefficient of Tm 
(߶) is indeed one. This regression can also be used to test for the power of our treatment for 
various bandwidth sizes. In Figure B1, we present estimates of ߶ for various bandwidths (ε) 
while first controlling only for the year fixed effect and then for all the municipality 
controls. The coefficient is below unity when the treatment is calculated using only the 
lotteries in the data, though we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that it is unity. However, 
when using larger bandwidths the point estimate is close to unity as it should be. This 
anomaly in the lottery sample may simply be a small sample statistical fluke. In particular, 
the first stage for the treatments when the interest group of interest is non-health care 
employees or female does not contain this anomaly (see Figures C1 and B5).  
The first stage is fairly precisely estimated for bandwidths larger than 0.04 (4 votes 
out of ten thousand). The control variables do not increase precision substantially. The 
lottery sample (bandwidth 0) produces noisy results, but precision increases as we increase 
the bandwidth. For a bandwidth of 0.04 the F-test statistics for the instrument is around 10 
and for the larger bandwidths it is substantially larger than 10 (e.g. for the 0.4 bandwidth 
with the controls, the F-test statistic is 60). From the perspective of statistical power, we 
should rely on the results that use bandwidths of about 0.08 or larger. 
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Figure B1. First stage for municipal employees. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence 
interval. The left hand graph includes only the year dummies as controls and the right hand graph includes all 
the controls used in Table 5 column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table B1. Post-treatment council covariate balance for all municipal employees. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Incumbents % 109 55.77 8.82 118 56.31 9.96 -0.54 
Women % 109 33.55 8.59 118 32.42 8.96 1.14 
High professionals % 109 20.29 10.63 118 20.58 10.43 -0.29 
University educated % 109 12.07 8.13 118 11.42 8.53 0.65 
Unemployed % 109 3.71 4.48 118 3.87 4.36 -0.16 
Center Party % 109 42.55 19.84 118 41.07 19.31 1.48 
Coalition Party % 109 17.10 9.59 118 17.75 10.84 -0.64 
Social Democratic Party % 109 18.06 9.62 118 19.71 10.83 -1.65 
Green party % 109 1.59 2.99 118 1.88 3.42 -0.29 
Left Alliance % 109 8.62 8.73 118 8.17 8.48 0.45 
Swedish Party % 109 3.08 13.22 118 3.80 15.97 -0.72 
True Finns % 109 2.04 4.90 118 1.77 3.99 0.28 
Christian Democrats % 109 3.06 3.84 118 2.95 4.15 0.11 
Other parties % 109 3.89 6.96 118 2.91 6.17 0.98 
ε = 0.4               
Incumbents % 588 57.26 9.16 557 57.29 8.85 -0.04 
Women % 588 34.72 8.76 557 33.18 8.40 1.54** 
High professionals % 588 23.34 12.84 557 22.06 11.83 1.27 
University educated % 588 14.57 10.72 557 13.47 10.07 1.11 
Unemployed % 588 3.47 3.88 557 3.43 3.99 0.04 
Center Party % 588 38.26 20.88 557 38.48 21.00 -0.22 
Coalition Party % 588 17.80 10.57 557 16.77 10.64 1.03 
Social Democratic Party % 588 20.33 11.27 557 20.62 11.23 -0.29 
Green party % 588 2.41 4.05 557 2.02 3.47 0.39 
Left Alliance % 588 8.37 8.12 557 8.19 8.04 0.18 
Swedish Party % 588 4.40 15.85 557 5.65 18.36 -1.25 
True Finns % 588 1.86 4.16 557 1.69 3.76 0.17 
Christian Democrats % 588 3.07 3.86 557 3.28 3.91 -0.21 
Other parties % 588 3.49 6.74 557 3.30 6.30 0.19 
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Figure B2. Robustness of the results in Table 6 for different bandwidths. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The 
specification includes year dummies as well as controls for parties' seat shares, population, squared population 
and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level. 
 
In Figure B3, we analyze the expenditure effects separately for each year instead of 
the mean over the whole council term (as done in the main text). These by-year estimates 
are all significant for the council term of interest, and similar in magnitude to the main 
results. We have also run by-year placebo regressions (four years prior to the council term 
of interest), and the estimates are insignificant, as they should. A slightly worrying 
observation is that the placebo point estimates are quite large even though insignificant. 
Further analysis revealed that this finding is driven solely by the last election term in the 
data. When we omit that election from the analysis the placebo estimates are closer to zero 
but comfortingly the estimates of key interest to us remain in this restricted sample very 
similar (see Figure B4) to those we report in the main text.  
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Figure B3. Effect separately for each year. 
Notes: The dots represent the point estimates and the grey lines the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. 
We report the effects municipal employee representation on log of total expenditures for each year’s 
expenditures separately. Time = 0 denotes the election year and years 1–4 the actual council term in office 
(separated by the red lines). The specification includes year dummies as well as controls for the parties' seat 
shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard 
errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
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Figure B4. Effects separately for each year excluding data from the last election term. 
Notes: The dots represent the point estimates and the grey lines the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. 
We report the effects municipal employee representation on log of total expenditures for each year’s 
expenditures separately. Time = 0 denotes the election year and years 1–4 the actual council term in office 
(separated by the red lines). The specification includes year dummies as well as controls for the parties' seat 
shares, population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard 
errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
 
Figure B5 reports the results from placebo thresholds analysis. Here, we move the 
within-party threshold of getting elected by steps of 0.05 when constructing the instrument 
(as described in the main text). Notice that when we artificially change the election 
thresholds, also the council size and the council composition artificially change. Therefore, 
at each of the artificial thresholds, we compute the respective placebo council sizes, seat 
shares of elected municipal employees and our instruments. For the first stage results 
reported in the left graph, we regress the actual municipal employee council share on the 
placebo instruments. As expected, the placebo results fluctuate around zero. One placebo 
estimate is statistically different from zero, but small in magnitude, which is not surprising 
due to multiple testing. For the IV results, we use a different first stage, however. For the 
IV to have any chance of producing non-zero effects, we also use the artificial council 
share of municipal employees as the endogenous variable of interest instead of the real 
share and instrument it with the placebo instrument. Using the placebo seat share ensures 
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that the first stage of the placebo IV is relevant, as there is one-to-one relationship between 
the placebo treatment and the placebo instrument even at the fake cut-offs. Both placebo 
tests are conducted using ε = 0.04 as the bandwidth. 
 
 
Figure B5. Effects for placebo thresholds.  
Notes: The left graph reports the first stage and the right graph the second stage IV estimates. The x-axis 
measures distance of the placebo threshold from the actual election threshold. The red line corresponds to the 
actual election threshold. The dots represent the point estimates and the grey lines the corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals. We report the effects of municipal employee representation on log of total expenditures. 
The specification includes year dummies as well as controls for the parties' seat shares, population, squared 
population and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
Es
tim
at
ed
 e
ffe
ct
−.03 −.02 −.01 0 .01 .02 .03
Threshold
First stage
−
.
01
−
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
Es
tim
at
ed
 e
ffe
ct
−.03 −.02 −.01 0 .01 .02 .03
Threshold
IV
47
 
 
Table B2. Pre-treatment covariate balance between the close sample and others.  
  Close elections No close elections 
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 143 5 320 893 968 5 346 843 -26 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 143 1 628 362 965 1 638 375 -10 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 143 3 692 727 965 3 708 690 -16 
Population 227 8 686 12 762 1317 13 184 37 979 -4 498 
Young inhabitants % 227 18.75 3.35 1317 18.45 3.34 0.29 
Old inhabitants % 227 18.04 4.60 1317 18.35 4.63 -0.32 
Council size 227 27.82 9.68 1317 29.18 11.09 -1.36 
Municipal employees % 143 28.20 12.75 965 27.53 13.40 0.66 
Municipal health care employees % 143 7.60 4.98 965 6.95 5.00 0.65 
Municipal non-health care employees % 143 20.59 11.36 965 20.58 12.63 0.01 
Incumbents % 143 56.89 8.55 965 57.22 9.07 -0.32 
Women % 143 34.05 8.95 965 32.82 8.93 1.23 
High professionals % 143 19.17 10.72 965 20.80 12.08 -1.63 
University educated % 143 11.08 7.52 965 12.25 9.69 -1.17 
Unemployed % 143 3.43 3.96 965 3.89 4.15 -0.46 
Center Party seat share % 227 40.51 19.73 1317 39.21 21.40 1.31 
Coalition Party seat share % 227 16.10 9.89 1317 15.61 10.46 0.49 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 227 20.66 10.82 1317 20.75 11.93 -0.09 
Green party seat share % 227 1.70 3.33 1317 1.87 3.50 -0.16 
Left Alliance seat share % 227 9.18 8.78 1317 8.43 8.31 0.75 
Swedish Party seat share % 227 3.53 14.83 1317 5.69 18.55 -2.16 
True Finns seat share % 227 2.21 4.38 1317 1.67 3.83 0.54 
Christian Democrats seat share % 227 2.87 3.75 1317 2.91 3.72 -0.04 
Other parties seat share % 227 3.24 6.55 1317 3.88 9.09 -0.64 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 810 5 330 823 301 5 376 919 -46 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 807 1 634 376 301 1 646 369 -12 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 807 3 697 666 301 3 729 768 -33 
Population 1145 15 571 40 687 399 3 773 3 153 11799*** 
Young inhabitants % 1145 18.65 3.27 399 18.07 3.51 0.58* 
Old inhabitants % 1145 17.70 4.54 399 20.04 4.42 -2.34*** 
Council size 1145 31.25 11.35 399 22.45 5.75 8.80*** 
Municipal employees % 807 28.03 13.24 301 26.50 13.48 1.53* 
Municipal health care employees % 807 7.26 4.94 301 6.44 5.11 0.82* 
Municipal non-health care employees % 807 20.78 12.40 301 20.06 12.67 0.72 
Incumbents % 807 57.66 8.81 301 55.87 9.40 1.80*** 
Women % 807 33.41 8.74 301 31.82 9.38 1.59** 
High professionals % 807 22.43 12.39 301 15.64 8.84 6.79*** 
University educated % 807 13.51 9.95 301 8.31 6.61 5.20*** 
Unemployed % 807 3.69 3.91 301 4.18 4.63 -0.49 
Center Party seat share % 1145 37.38 21.16 399 45.20 20.08 7.82*** 
Coalition Party seat share % 1145 16.56 10.13 399 13.15 10.68 3.41*** 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 1145 21.63 11.70 399 18.16 11.60 3.47*** 
Green party seat share % 1145 2.16 3.75 399 0.92 2.32 1.25*** 
Left Alliance seat share % 1145 9.02 8.51 399 7.15 7.86 1.87** 
Swedish Party seat share % 1145 5.10 17.32 399 6.14 20.03 -1.03 
True Finns seat share % 1145 1.74 3.85 399 1.79 4.13 -0.05 
Christian Democrats seat share % 1145 3.06 3.63 399 2.44 3.96 0.62* 
Other parties seat share % 1145 3.34 6.43 399 5.05 13.29 -1.70* 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table B3. The effect of municipal employment council share on total expenditures using 
only the close elections sample.  
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0035* 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 
  [0.0019] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]    
First stage F 54.25 57.76 58.76 59.76 
N 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 0.0032* 0.0042*** 0.0037*** 0.0035** 
  [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0014]    
R2 0.3 0.42 0.58 0.59 
N 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
Vote share control is a second-order polynomial of municipal employees' vote share. First stage F-statistic 
reported for the IV estimations is the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. Moreover, we report p-values from 
testing the joint significance of the treatments. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance 
levels respectively. 
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Table B4. Results for total expenditures: IV analysis for both municipal employee and 
female instruments. 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0014 0.0032* 0.0034** 0.0035** 
[0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0016] 
Females 0.0041** 0.0032** 0.0013 0.016 
[0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.012] 
First stage F 24.21 25.91 26.85 147.82 
Panel B: Reduced form, ε = 0.4 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Municipal employees 0.0017 0.0030* 0.0037** 0.0030** 
[0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0014] 
Females 0.0044** 0.0038** 0.0018 0.017 
[0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.013] 
R2 0.29 0.43 0.57 0.59 
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes 
Vote share No No No Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
First stage F-statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Figure B6. First stage for females. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence 
interval. The left hand graph includes only the year dummies as controls and the right hand graph includes all 
the controls used in Table 5 column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table B5. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality level for female. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 95 5 346 969 96 5 184 736 161.37 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 95 1 610 300 96 1 590 370 20.76 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 95 3 736 790 96 3 595 622 140.81 
Population 139 7 518 9 108 135 8 870 16 924 -1 351 
Young inhabitants % 139 18.38 3.10 135 18.52 3.35 -0.14 
Old inhabitants % 139 18.79 4.67 135 18.18 4.49 0.60 
Council size 139 27.17 9.38 135 27.81 9.46 -0.64 
Municipal employees % 95 28.33 12.82 96 27.51 11.75 0.82 
Municipal health care employees % 95 7.50 5.53 96 7.56 4.83 -0.06 
Municipal non-health care employees % 95 20.83 11.92 96 19.95 10.36 0.88 
Incumbents % 95 57.02 8.60 96 57.58 8.64 -0.55 
Women % 95 33.64 9.49 96 34.08 8.06 -0.44 
Instrument for women 95 0.00 0.11 96 -0.14 0.11 0.14 
High professionals % 95 17.86 9.69 96 21.24 10.69 -3.38** 
University educated % 95 10.34 7.42 96 12.16 8.83 -1.82 
Unemployed % 95 3.57 4.52 96 3.96 4.07 -0.40 
Center Party seat share % 139 41.41 20.27 135 39.61 19.03 1.80 
Coalition Party seat share % 139 15.38 10.26 135 16.66 10.59 -1.28 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 139 20.99 11.64 135 21.71 10.54 -0.72 
Green party seat share % 139 1.38 2.78 135 1.45 3.02 -0.07 
Left Alliance seat share % 139 8.13 8.12 135 8.46 8.38 -0.34 
Swedish Party seat share % 139 3.95 15.34 135 4.28 15.50 -0.33 
True Finns seat share % 139 2.05 4.88 135 2.23 4.20 -0.18 
Christian Democrats seat share % 139 2.39 3.66 135 2.98 4.19 -0.59 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 428 5 382 863 485 5 272 778 110.00 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 427 1 653 361 483 1 623 366 29.95 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 427 3 729 678 483 3 649 635 79.90 
Population 596 14 154 33 116 674 14 708 43 222 -553.71 
Young inhabitants % 596 18.53 3.20 674 18.83 3.39 -0.30 
Old inhabitants % 596 17.98 4.59 674 17.72 4.48 0.26 
Council size 596 30.62 11.30 674 30.36 11.09 0.26 
Municipal employees % 427 28.85 13.73 483 27.34 12.79 1.51* 
Municipal health care employees % 427 7.14 5.08 483 7.30 4.83 -0.16 
Municipal non-health care employees % 427 21.71 12.80 483 20.04 11.90 1.66 
Incumbents % 427 57.53 8.85 483 57.46 8.87 0.07 
Women % 427 33.14 8.69 483 33.24 8.65 -0.10 
Instrument for women 427 -0.05 0.12 483 -0.29 0.11 0.24 
High professionals % 427 21.23 11.72 483 22.41 12.48 -1.17 
University educated % 427 12.77 9.47 483 13.18 10.07 -0.41 
Unemployed % 427 3.78 4.19 483 3.81 3.95 -0.03 
Center Party seat share % 596 38.22 21.51 674 38.22 21.44 0.00 
Coalition Party seat share % 596 16.13 10.47 674 16.19 10.31 -0.06 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 596 21.03 11.61 674 21.30 11.98 -0.27 
Green party seat share % 596 2.03 3.50 674 2.04 3.76 0.00 
Left Alliance seat share % 596 9.18 8.52 674 8.59 8.43 0.59 
Swedish Party seat share % 596 4.98 16.97 674 5.91 19.18 -0.93 
True Finns seat share % 596 1.78 3.91 674 1.62 3.86 0.15 
Christian Democrats seat share % 596 2.89 3.68 674 3.01 3.71 -0.12 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table B6. Post-treatment covariate balance at municipality level for female. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Incumbents % 139 56.46 8.19 135 56.09 8.91 0.37 
Municipal employees % 139 27.97 11.31 135 25.22 12.48 2.75* 
High professionals % 139 18.41 10.71 135 20.45 10.44 -2.04 
University educated % 139 10.83 8.28 135 12.31 9.51 -1.48 
Unemployed % 139 3.66 4.30 135 3.72 4.74 -0.06 
Center Party % 139 43.04 20.30 135 40.71 19.06 2.33 
Coalition Party % 139 15.81 10.98 135 17.12 11.28 -1.32 
Social Democratic Party % 139 19.40 10.75 135 20.16 10.72 -0.76 
Green party % 139 1.51 2.93 135 1.44 3.09 0.07 
Left Alliance % 139 7.16 7.54 135 7.87 8.32 -0.71 
Swedish Party % 139 3.86 15.11 135 4.25 15.44 -0.39 
True Finns % 139 2.12 5.27 135 1.85 4.36 0.27 
Christian Democrats % 139 2.47 3.52 135 3.48 4.68 -1.01* 
Other parties % 139 4.64 11.02 135 3.13 5.96 1.51 
ε = 0.4               
Incumbents % 596 57.12 8.62 674 56.92 9.35 0.20 
Municipal employees % 596 27.62 12.44 674 26.33 12.26 1.28* 
High professionals % 596 21.71 12.15 674 22.46 12.17 -0.75 
University educated % 596 13.44 10.27 674 13.55 10.20 -0.10 
Unemployed % 596 3.63 4.06 674 3.34 3.92 0.29 
Center Party % 596 39.20 21.28 674 39.41 21.65 -0.21 
Coalition Party % 596 16.65 11.00 674 16.82 10.72 -0.17 
Social Democratic Party % 596 19.96 11.27 674 19.86 11.40 0.10 
Green party % 596 2.08 3.49 674 2.13 3.86 -0.05 
Left Alliance % 596 8.45 8.09 674 7.84 8.03 0.61 
Swedish Party % 596 4.95 16.87 674 5.81 19.04 -0.86 
True Finns % 596 1.80 3.95 674 1.74 4.31 0.06 
Christian Democrats % 596 2.97 3.85 674 3.16 4.05 -0.19 
Other parties % 596 3.96 8.08 674 3.25 6.70 0.71 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Appendix C: Validity and robustness of the sectoral effects  
 
We present here the robustness of the results in Table 7 over a range of bandwidths. We 
also show robustness to accounting the correlation between the municipal employee status 
and gender by instrumenting also for the female seat share in the council. We also report 
the first stages of our sectoral IV across a range of bandwidths and test for the validity of 
the sector specific instruments. 
 
 
Figure C1. Robustness of the non-health outcome results in Table 7 for different 
bandwidths. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The 
specification includes year dummies as well as control for parties' seat shares, population, squared population 
and shares of young and old citizens (all controls are lagged). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level. 
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Figure C2. Robustness of the health outcome results in Table 7 for different bandwidths. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence 
interval. The left hand graph includes only the year dummies as controls and the right hand graph includes all 
the controls used in Table 5 column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table C1. Results for sectoral expenditures: IV analysis with ε = 0.4 for both sectoral 
municipal employee and female instruments. 
  
Outcome: non health 
care expenditures 
Outcome: health care 
expenditures 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0050** 0.004 
[0.0023] [0.0036] 
Municipal health care employees -0.0013 0.0021 
[0.0028] [0.0033] 
Female 0.0018 0.002 
[0.0016] [0.0028] 
First stage F 3.54 3.51 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) 
Municipal non health care employees 0.0037* 0.0012 
[0.0021] [0.0035] 
Municipal health care employees 0.0005 0.0056* 
[0.0032] [0.0034] 
Female 0.0030* 0.003 
[0.0017] [0.0031] 
R2 0.44 0.18 
N 1544 1534 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
First stage F-statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Figure C3. First stage for municipal health sector employees. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence 
interval. The left hand graph includes only the year dummies as controls and the right hand graph includes all 
the controls used in Table 5 column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Figure C4. First stage for municipal non-health sector employees. 
Notes: The solid line represents the first stage point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence 
interval. The left hand graph includes only the year dummies as controls and the right hand graph includes all 
the controls used in Table 5 column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table C2. Pre-treatment covariate balance at municipality level for non-health care 
employees.  
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 45 5 427 1 029 59 5 407 943 20 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 45 1 596 326 59 1 681 410 -84 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 45 3 831 888 59 3 727 745 105 
Population 79 6 699 6 043 93 8 731 11 688 -2 032 
Young inhabitants % 79 18.63 3.46 93 18.47 3.14 0.16 
Old inhabitants % 79 18.27 4.31 93 18.22 4.77 0.04 
Council size 79 27.18 7.98 93 27.80 10.20 -0.62 
Municipal employees % 45 29.25 13.98 59 26.03 10.94 3.22 
Municipal health care employees % 45 8.03 5.06 59 6.65 4.21 1.39 
Municipal non-health care employees % 45 21.22 12.47 59 19.38 10.34 1.84 
Instrument for non-health care employees 45 -0.04 0.07 59 -0.05 0.07 0.01 
Incumbents % 45 57.24 7.68 59 57.18 8.72 0.06 
Women % 45 34.84 10.12 59 33.87 8.68 0.98 
High professionals % 45 19.77 10.45 59 18.76 10.42 1.01 
University educated % 45 10.92 6.95 59 10.37 7.22 0.55 
Unemployed % 45 2.75 3.27 59 4.10 4.78 -1.35 
Center Party seat share % 79 39.21 17.60 93 42.17 19.53 -2.96 
Coalition Party seat share % 79 16.44 9.68 93 15.12 9.78 1.32 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 79 21.55 10.70 93 21.11 10.50 0.44 
Green party seat share % 79 1.69 3.13 93 1.75 3.76 -0.06 
Left Alliance seat share % 79 9.55 8.64 93 9.20 9.01 0.35 
Swedish Party seat share % 79 2.70 13.65 93 2.84 12.62 -0.14 
True Finns seat share % 79 2.44 5.04 93 2.13 4.15 0.31 
Christian Democrats seat share % 79 3.21 4.05 93 2.61 3.36 0.61 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 334 5 330 810 359 5 363 808 -33 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 333 1 626 384 357 1 633 364 -7 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 333 3 708 685 357 3 729 655 -21 
Population 522 18 381 48 476 496 15 341 36 231 3 041 
Young inhabitants % 522 18.77 3.22 496 18.67 3.31 0.10 
Old inhabitants % 522 17.21 4.54 496 17.76 4.52 -0.56 
Council size 522 32.71 11.78 496 31.30 11.41 1.41 
Municipal employees % 333 28.82 13.23 357 27.81 13.62 1.01 
Municipal health care employees % 333 7.34 4.72 357 7.03 4.88 0.31 
Municipal non-health care employees % 333 21.48 12.60 357 20.78 12.28 0.70 
Instrument for non-health care employees 333 0.18 0.11 357 0.09 0.11 0.09 
Incumbents % 333 57.90 8.40 357 57.99 8.97 -0.09 
Women % 333 33.76 9.18 357 33.13 8.48 0.63 
High professionals % 333 24.00 12.80 357 22.71 12.71 1.29 
University educated % 333 14.43 10.43 357 13.77 10.20 0.66 
Unemployed % 333 3.79 3.93 357 3.57 3.98 0.22 
Center Party seat share % 522 36.03 21.10 496 37.59 21.45 -1.56 
Coalition Party seat share % 522 17.45 9.94 496 15.93 10.32 1.52 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 522 22.46 12.12 496 21.18 11.38 1.29 
Green party seat share % 522 2.52 4.00 496 2.09 3.66 0.43 
Left Alliance seat share % 522 9.39 8.74 496 8.90 8.30 0.49 
Swedish Party seat share % 522 3.98 14.97 496 5.85 18.69 -1.88 
True Finns seat share % 522 1.97 4.19 496 1.66 3.64 0.31 
Christian Democrats seat share % 522 3.04 3.56 496 3.20 3.59 -0.16 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table C3. Post-treatment council covariate balance for non-health care sector municipal 
employees. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Incumbents % 79 55.45 8.99 93 57.33 9.55 -1.88 
Women % 79 34.30 8.72 93 32.79 9.32 1.51 
High professionals % 79 20.18 9.05 93 20.16 10.53 0.02 
University educated % 79 11.00 7.40 93 11.33 8.79 -0.33 
Unemployed % 79 4.07 4.81 93 3.96 4.60 0.11 
Center Party % 79 41.55 16.97 93 42.41 18.79 -0.86 
Coalition Party % 79 17.33 9.44 93 16.83 10.48 0.50 
Social Democratic Party % 79 19.54 9.34 93 19.78 10.34 -0.24 
Green party % 79 1.49 2.69 93 2.07 3.77 -0.57 
Left Alliance % 79 8.70 9.02 93 8.71 8.90 0.00 
Swedish Party % 79 2.47 12.90 93 2.80 12.68 -0.33 
True Finns % 79 2.03 5.36 93 1.77 4.15 0.26 
Christian Democrats % 79 3.07 3.88 93 2.53 3.47 0.53 
Other parties % 79 3.82 7.33 93 3.10 6.33 0.72 
ε = 0.4               
Incumbents % 522 57.25 9.09 496 57.48 8.95 -0.24 
Women % 522 34.45 8.84 496 33.62 8.47 0.83 
High professionals % 522 24.02 12.80 496 22.66 12.43 1.36 
University educated % 522 14.67 10.79 496 14.03 10.59 0.64 
Unemployed % 522 3.61 3.93 496 3.35 3.87 0.26 
Center Party % 522 37.50 20.92 496 38.29 21.23 -0.79 
Coalition Party % 522 18.15 10.54 496 16.78 10.73 1.37 
Social Democratic Party % 522 21.02 11.46 496 20.27 11.06 0.75 
Green party % 522 2.53 4.04 496 2.22 3.72 0.31 
Left Alliance % 522 8.56 8.35 496 8.23 7.97 0.32 
Swedish Party % 522 3.84 14.57 496 5.78 18.56 -1.94 
True Finns % 522 1.87 4.24 496 1.75 3.78 0.12 
Christian Democrats % 522 3.08 3.79 496 3.30 3.81 -0.23 
Other parties % 522 3.46 6.69 496 3.37 6.31 0.09 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table C4. Pre-treatment covariate balance for health care employees.  
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0  N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 35 5 225 835 27 5 220 607 5.14 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 35 1 588 388 27 1 581 229 6.82 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 35 3 637 598 27 3 639 480 -1.67 
Population 44 12 334 21 380 38 9 540 10 939 2 794 
Young inhabitants % 44 19.35 4.01 38 19.02 2.46 0.34 
Old inhabitants % 44 17.26 5.09 38 17.44 3.97 -0.18 
Council size 44 29.32 11.44 38 28.63 9.77 0.69 
Municipal employees % 35 29.20 14.30 27 32.80 12.87 -3.61 
Municipal health care employees % 35 7.71 6.34 27 9.85 4.99 -2.14 
Instrument for health care employees 35 0.02 0.06 27 0.08 0.07 -0.06 
Municipal non-health care employees % 35 21.49 11.42 27 22.95 11.25 -1.47 
Incumbents % 35 57.73 7.66 27 59.43 10.11 -1.70 
Women % 35 32.53 10.22 27 34.47 9.14 -1.94 
High professionals % 35 19.40 13.30 27 23.10 10.31 -3.70 
University educated % 35 12.65 7.94 27 12.04 8.27 0.61 
Unemployed % 35 3.27 3.35 27 3.89 3.49 -0.63 
Center Party seat share % 44 42.96 23.28 38 37.11 18.55 5.85 
Coalition Party seat share % 44 15.98 9.50 38 18.68 10.19 -2.70 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 44 17.09 10.74 38 21.31 11.41 -4.22 
Green party seat share % 44 2.08 3.25 38 1.00 2.09 1.08* 
Left Alliance seat share % 44 10.48 9.69 38 9.51 9.00 0.97 
Swedish Party seat share % 44 3.26 12.02 38 4.88 19.74 -1.62 
True Finns seat share % 44 1.55 3.19 38 1.62 3.33 -0.07 
Christian Democrats seat share % 44 2.65 3.53 38 3.04 4.00 -0.40 
ε = 0.4 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 222 5 314 790 227 5 234 777 79.21 
Health care expenditures (€ per capita) 222 1 642 381 226 1 588 348 54.06 
Other expenditures (€ per capita) 222 3 668 579 226 3 648 675 19.76 
Population 305 23 734 60 686 319 18 758 43 304 4 976 
Young inhabitants % 305 18.57 3.17 319 18.94 3.26 -0.37 
Old inhabitants % 305 17.13 4.75 319 16.96 4.33 0.17 
Council size 305 34.48 12.77 319 33.10 11.80 1.38 
Municipal employees % 222 30.60 14.60 226 28.77 12.32 1.83 
Municipal health care employees % 222 8.16 5.30 226 8.00 4.68 0.15 
Instrument for health care employees 222 0.09 0.08 226 -0.11 0.08 0.20* 
Municipal non-health care employees % 222 22.44 13.45 226 20.77 11.95 1.67 
Incumbents % 222 59.18 8.72 226 57.74 8.68 1.44 
Women % 222 34.02 8.59 226 34.48 8.64 -0.46 
High professionals % 222 24.96 13.68 226 24.94 12.69 0.02 
University educated % 222 15.74 10.61 226 15.10 10.92 0.64 
Unemployed % 222 3.57 3.47 226 3.43 3.77 0.14 
Center Party seat share % 305 34.51 21.18 319 35.14 20.90 -0.63 
Coalition Party seat share % 305 17.21 9.88 319 17.75 10.09 -0.54 
Social Democratic Party seat share % 305 22.95 11.65 319 22.69 11.79 0.26 
Green party seat share % 305 2.99 4.44 319 2.44 4.03 0.56 
Left Alliance seat share % 305 9.37 8.41 319 9.31 8.45 0.06 
Swedish Party seat share % 305 4.85 16.61 319 4.29 16.53 0.56 
True Finns seat share % 305 1.44 2.95 319 1.67 3.89 -0.23 
Christian Democrats seat share % 305 3.24 3.56 319 3.22 3.40 0.02 
 Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table C5. Post-treatment council covariate balance for health care sector employees. 
  Tmt > 0 Tmt < 0   
ε = 0 (lotteries) N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Incumbents % 44 56.60 9.03 38 53.67 10.48 2.93 
Women % 44 33.57 8.39 38 32.21 7.95 1.35 
High professionals % 44 21.41 12.75 38 22.06 9.83 -0.65 
University educated % 44 13.79 9.08 38 11.69 7.98 2.10 
Unemployed % 44 2.54 3.24 38 3.24 3.48 -0.70 
Center Party % 44 44.41 23.40 38 38.26 19.33 6.16 
Coalition Party % 44 17.06 10.27 38 19.74 11.02 -2.68 
Social Democratic Party % 44 15.12 9.48 38 18.79 11.43 -3.68 
Green party % 44 1.85 3.49 38 1.37 2.12 0.48 
Left Alliance % 44 9.51 8.96 38 8.34 8.58 1.16 
Swedish Party % 44 3.21 11.82 38 4.94 20.19 -1.74 
True Finns % 44 1.62 3.08 38 1.59 3.02 0.03 
Christian Democrats % 44 2.98 3.81 38 3.89 5.11 -0.92 
Other parties % 44 4.26 6.69 38 3.07 6.66 1.18 
ε = 0.4               
Incumbents % 305 57.58 8.83 319 58.13 8.88 -0.55 
Women % 305 35.86 7.69 319 33.86 8.53 2.00** 
High professionals % 305 25.47 13.47 319 24.11 12.47 1.36 
University educated % 305 16.35 11.44 319 15.38 10.74 0.98 
Unemployed % 305 3.16 3.43 319 3.22 3.88 -0.06 
Center Party % 305 35.96 21.03 319 36.06 20.81 -0.10 
Coalition Party % 305 17.80 10.35 319 18.40 10.73 -0.60 
Social Democratic Party % 305 21.52 11.29 319 21.18 11.47 0.35 
Green party % 305 2.98 4.66 319 2.54 3.85 0.44 
Left Alliance % 305 8.71 7.98 319 8.61 8.10 0.10 
Swedish Party % 305 4.74 16.33 319 4.16 16.12 0.58 
True Finns % 305 1.75 3.54 319 1.88 3.79 -0.13 
Christian Democrats % 305 3.32 3.79 319 3.49 3.79 -0.17 
Other parties % 305 3.22 6.27 319 3.69 7.02 -0.47 
Notes: The statistical significance is tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Appendix D: Robustness of the party size heterogeneity in the effect  
 
We analyze here whether also the sectoral results are stronger for the largest party and 
whether the by party results for the total expenditures hold when instrumenting also the 
female share. 
 
Table D1. Results for sectoral expenditures by party size. 
  
Outcome: health care 
expenditures 
Outcome: non health care 
expenditures 
  Largest party 2
nd largest 
party Largest party 
2nd largest 
party 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Health care employees 0.0133** -0.0413 0.0008 0.3327 
[0.0066] [0.5556] [0.0042] [1.6703] 
Non health care employees 0.0039 0.0136 0.0051** 0.0172 
[0.0048] [0.0490] [0.0024] [0.1400] 
First stage F 41.81 0.02 41.81 0.02 
Panel B: Reduced form, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) (3) (4) 
Health care employees 0.0104** -0.0040 -0.0007 0.0039 
[0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0035] [0.0052] 
Non health care employees 0.0054 0.0017 0.0057** 0.0012 
[0.0056] [0.0040] [0.0028] [0.0049] 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.43 0.43 
N 1534 1534 1534 1534 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is either the 
logarithm of the mean of per capita other than health care expenditures or health care expenditures over the 
council term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls 
include parties' lagged seat shares. Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and 
shares of young and old citizens. First stage F-statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleinbergen-Paap 
Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table D2. Results for sectoral expenditures: IV analysis for both municipal employee 
groups and female instruments. 
  
Largest party 2
nd largest 
party 
Panel A: IV, ε = 0.4 (1) (2) 
Municipal employees 0.0033 0.0030 
[0.0021] [0.0036] 
Females 0.0035* -0.0025 
[0.0018] [0.0030] 
First stage F 38.33 17.68 
Panel B: Reduced form, ε = 0.4 (3) (4) 
Municipal employees 0.0037* 0.0026 
[0.0020] [0.0032] 
Females 0.0034** -0.0017 
[0.0016] [0.0025] 
R2 0.57 0.57 
N 1544 1544 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Party and municipality controls Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable in all the 
models is the logarithm of the mean of per capita total expenditures over the council term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. Party controls include parties' lagged seat shares. 
Municipality controls include lagged population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens. 
First stage F-statistic reported for the IV estimations is the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. ***, ** and * 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively.  
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Appendix E: Rent-seeking results  
 
We report the rent-seeking estimations using candidate level data in Table E1 and the 
house-price regressions using municipal level data in Table E2. Last, we probe the 
robustness of the results in Table E1 to different bandwidths. 
 
Table E1. Returns to office for elected municipal employees and other candidates. 
  Panel A: Log(Change in income from t to t+1) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Elected 0.1468 -0.0399  -0.1696 -0.0856 
[0.2183] [0.2118]  [0.1222] [0.1199] 
N 114 114  347 347 
R2 0.00 0.20  0.01 0.15 
  Panel B: Unemployed t+1 
  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Elected 0.0104 0.0040  0.0033 -0.0008 
[0.0214] [0.0221]  [0.0122] [0.0123] 
N 207 207  588 588 
R2 0.00 0.04  0.00 0.11 
  Panel C: Elected t+1 
  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Elected 0.0407 0.0396  0.0013 0.0039 
[0.0506] [0.0516]  [0.0283] [0.0285] 
N 330 330  990 990 
R2 0.00 0.06  0.00 0.04 
  Panel D: Vote share t+1 
  (13) (14)  (15) (16) 
Elected 0.1113 0.0265  -0.0538 -0.0531 
[0.1348] [0.1328]  [0.0882] [0.0847] 
N 202 202  598 598 
R2 0.00 0.18  0.00 0.23 
Sample Municipal employees  Other candidates 
Individual characteristics No Yes  No Yes 
Notes: Unit of observation is individual candidate at election period t. Individual characteristics include 
gender, age, incumbency status, unemployment status, student dummy, entrepreneur dummy, high 
professional dummy, party affiliation and vote share t–1. In panel B, we include only the candidates that are 
employed at time t to make the other candidates group comparable to municipal employees group. In panel C, 
candidates who do not re-run have elected t+1 status of zero. In panel D, those who do not re-run are 
excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses.  
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We then turn to our analysis of municipal house prices. We exclude 309 
municipality-election period observations from the sample because these small 
municipalities do not have many housing market transactions. 
 
Table E2. Results for house prices 
Outcome: log(house price per m2) 
ATE, ε = 0.4 (1) 
Municipal employees 0.0000 
  [0.0021] 
Female -0.0002 
  [0.0019] 
R2 0.77 
N 1235 
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality m in election period t. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the mean of per square meter house prices over the council term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level and reported in parentheses. Controls include year dummies, parties' lagged seat shares, 
municipality population, squared population and shares of young and old citizens (all lagged). ***, ** and * 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Panel A: RDD effect of getting elected at t on earnings at t+1 for a range of bandwidths.  
 
Panel B: RDD effect of getting elected at t on unemployment at t+1 for a range of 
bandwidths.
 
Panel C: RDD effect of getting elected at t on elected at t+1 for a range of bandwidths. 
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Panel D: RDD effect of getting elected at t on vote share at t+1 for a range of bandwidths. 
 
Figure E1. Robustness of the results in Table 7 for using RDD and for a wider range of 
bandwidths. 
Notes: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dotted lines the 95% confidence interval. The 
results are from the conventional local linear RD specifications for various bandwidths. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level. In all the panels, the left hand graph applies to the sample of municipal 
employees and right hand graph for the other candidates. The red line marks the Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012) optimal bandwidth.  
 
In Figure E2, we explore the stated preferences of municipal employee candidates 
and the candidates from other occupations with respect to questions concerning the role of 
municipal employees in local politics. We use survey data from the Finnish Broadcasting 
Company (YLE) concerning the 2012 municipal elections. The data is from an election aid 
survey in which both candidates and voters respond to a same set of questions and the 
application provides voters with information on the best matches.  
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Figure E2. Survey responses (N = 4215). 
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